It seems the president of William and Mary is being fired for taking down a cross from a multi-faith worship room. From an entirely normative standpoint, was this the right decision? It is a multi-faith worship room, and Christianity is a faith, so why can't it be present? Does it really matter so much where the cross should be placed, if it is higher or bigger than the other religious symbols? Is this a case of American secularism which is meant to make other religions feel more welcome or French secularism which is meant to abolish the practice of religion in public places?
http://www.wm.edu/news/?id=8672
Your thoughts are welcome.
Thursday, February 14, 2008
Sunday, December 2, 2007
Repressed Muslim Populations
It is commonly asked why Muslim states in the general vicinity of Israel (from Egypt to Pakistan including the Gulf states) have such intellectually repressed Muslim populations. A columnist at the New York Times, Nicholas Kristof, describes two distinct forms of Islam. One he calls "desert Islam" which promotes an "austere fundamentalism" and the other "riverine or coastal Islam" which is much more "outward-looking, flexible, and tolerant." As is suggested from Kristof's phraseology, the problem could be geographic. To someone like Bernard Lewis, the problem might in fact be ethnic. Huntington might suggest that Muslims were created to be intellectually repressed. Christian intellectuals from the region, like Fawaz Gerges or Edward Said, might attribute the problem to economic or political conditions. Islamic Politicians might blame all the world's problems on Israeli occupation. I thought I would suggest my own theory for those not satisfied with anything less than complexity.
Before I begin to answer this question, I would like to provide a short refresher on the history of Western Europe. After the fall of the Roman Empire and the formation of Christianity, two major authorities formed within the void. The Eastern Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church acted as the people's religious and political authority. (This discussion will remain in the West.) It was not until the 16th century that the Roman Catholic Church began to lose much of its political and religious authority in the region. Now here is where the description of historical accounts gets tricky. I will refer to the US non-denominational interpretation of European History to make my point. (My high-school European History teacher was Roman Catholic, so he had some interesting things to say about the Protestant Reformation.) It seems the Roman Catholic Church felt threatened by intellectual and theological inquiry not predetermined by the firmly established doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church. Personalities such as Martin Luther felt immersed in restricted and unintelligent beliefs. Other intellectuals such as Gallileo, saw through observation that the Church's explanations were severly lacking. The Church was unable to keep a hold on its political, religious, and intellectual authority and underwent a painful separation with many of its followers. Years of turmoil followed the Protestant Reformation with nations warring each other on the basis of religious belief, along with many other things. This time period promoted political philosophers such as Hobbes to describe humanity's despicable nature. It was not until Christianity's theologians along with its political theorists came up with a solution that removed belief from the legitimacy of political conflict, that individual believers began to feel safe within their own societies.
Islamic history does not have a very different story than this, with two long-lasting Islamic empires undergoing a significant separation from its base. The first, the Abbasid Caliphate, though being obliterated by the advent of the Mongols, in fact lost most of its political, religious, and intellectual authority many years prior. At the time the Mongols invaded, most of the region was being run by warring Turkic tribes who had their own scholars of religion and their own political systems. A second empire, the Ottoman empire, was harshly rejected by nearly all of its subjects, from Turkey to the Arab states, nearly 100 years ago. This brings us to today.
History shows us that humanity's advancement is promoted by political, religious, and intellectual inquiry. As the populace progresses socially, intellectual inquiry decreases significantly and is replaced by intellectual stagnation. Religious, political, and scientific thought redevelop within this period of stagnation. As intellectual thought increases, the social order wishes to gravitate away from a repressive authority. The region is thrown into a period of instability. Politically ambitious groups advantageously use the confusion of this tumultuous time to establish their competing authorities over the region. Along with this, pressures from surrounding, continually changing empires add to the region's instability. And this story takes at least several hundred years.
For a social scientist whose thoughts are shaped significantly by the history of the United States, it might be uncommon to look thoroughly beyond a 300 year time period for a solution to some puzzle. Nonetheless, my answer to the question of why the states that once made up the Ottoman and Safavid empires are now in such disarray is that history is just being history. Am I suggesting then that there is no solution to this problem. Actually, I am offering a solution. It is just be patient, refrain from unnecessary violence and name-calling, work for human rights and conflict resolution, and things will work out in the end. In a sense, I suppose this is also a simple answer. Perhaps then I was being coy when I said I was going to be complex.
ali
Before I begin to answer this question, I would like to provide a short refresher on the history of Western Europe. After the fall of the Roman Empire and the formation of Christianity, two major authorities formed within the void. The Eastern Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church acted as the people's religious and political authority. (This discussion will remain in the West.) It was not until the 16th century that the Roman Catholic Church began to lose much of its political and religious authority in the region. Now here is where the description of historical accounts gets tricky. I will refer to the US non-denominational interpretation of European History to make my point. (My high-school European History teacher was Roman Catholic, so he had some interesting things to say about the Protestant Reformation.) It seems the Roman Catholic Church felt threatened by intellectual and theological inquiry not predetermined by the firmly established doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church. Personalities such as Martin Luther felt immersed in restricted and unintelligent beliefs. Other intellectuals such as Gallileo, saw through observation that the Church's explanations were severly lacking. The Church was unable to keep a hold on its political, religious, and intellectual authority and underwent a painful separation with many of its followers. Years of turmoil followed the Protestant Reformation with nations warring each other on the basis of religious belief, along with many other things. This time period promoted political philosophers such as Hobbes to describe humanity's despicable nature. It was not until Christianity's theologians along with its political theorists came up with a solution that removed belief from the legitimacy of political conflict, that individual believers began to feel safe within their own societies.
Islamic history does not have a very different story than this, with two long-lasting Islamic empires undergoing a significant separation from its base. The first, the Abbasid Caliphate, though being obliterated by the advent of the Mongols, in fact lost most of its political, religious, and intellectual authority many years prior. At the time the Mongols invaded, most of the region was being run by warring Turkic tribes who had their own scholars of religion and their own political systems. A second empire, the Ottoman empire, was harshly rejected by nearly all of its subjects, from Turkey to the Arab states, nearly 100 years ago. This brings us to today.
History shows us that humanity's advancement is promoted by political, religious, and intellectual inquiry. As the populace progresses socially, intellectual inquiry decreases significantly and is replaced by intellectual stagnation. Religious, political, and scientific thought redevelop within this period of stagnation. As intellectual thought increases, the social order wishes to gravitate away from a repressive authority. The region is thrown into a period of instability. Politically ambitious groups advantageously use the confusion of this tumultuous time to establish their competing authorities over the region. Along with this, pressures from surrounding, continually changing empires add to the region's instability. And this story takes at least several hundred years.
For a social scientist whose thoughts are shaped significantly by the history of the United States, it might be uncommon to look thoroughly beyond a 300 year time period for a solution to some puzzle. Nonetheless, my answer to the question of why the states that once made up the Ottoman and Safavid empires are now in such disarray is that history is just being history. Am I suggesting then that there is no solution to this problem. Actually, I am offering a solution. It is just be patient, refrain from unnecessary violence and name-calling, work for human rights and conflict resolution, and things will work out in the end. In a sense, I suppose this is also a simple answer. Perhaps then I was being coy when I said I was going to be complex.
ali
Monday, November 26, 2007
Excellent Video Cast
In anticipation of Friday’s discussion, there is an excellent video cast entitled “Islam and the Challenge of Democracy” between Khaled Abou El-Fadl (a former Princeton scholar now at UCLA) and Fawas Gerges (I referenced his work on Islamism in my presentation). The video cast is long, but the points of interest may be around the 15 minute mark and again at the 45 minute mark. Here is the link: http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/124/
Saturday, November 17, 2007
Following up on my presentation, I wanted to suggest Mehrah Kamrava's edited volume of "The New Voices of Islam: Rethinking Politics and Modernity, (2006) which has pieces from 13 or 14 of leading Muslim intellectuals, and it captures well the plurality of thought on the issues that I raised in the presentation. Also, Bekim Agai has a piece in "Schooling Islam" (2007) on Turkish state policies towards Islamic higher education touches a good deal on the contributions of Fethullah Gulen. There is an interest in these topics in our group, so I figured I'd make the recommendations knowing of course that several people most likely have these titles on the shelf already.
Zvi-I thought of the philosophy of the OneVoice Movement and others like it when I read your post. These projects are mainly working to stimulate citizen dialogue, but part of their project is also to push for more transparency in diplomatic affairs, as part of the way forward.
C.M.L.
Zvi-I thought of the philosophy of the OneVoice Movement and others like it when I read your post. These projects are mainly working to stimulate citizen dialogue, but part of their project is also to push for more transparency in diplomatic affairs, as part of the way forward.
C.M.L.
Getting World Peace
Getting World Peace
Hi everyone - so I had this random idea. What if world peace can only be achieved by the ignorant? Let me explain. There is a scene in the Hitch Hikers Guide to the Galaxy where the protagonists visit this planet inhabited by one man who lives in a cabin and who is, for all intents and purposes, crazy. One particularly knowledgeable character explains that it is this individual who runs the universe. Who else could?
I wonder if this is truer than Douglas Adams thought. I have been researching negotiation strategies and I have an idea about a new model for Israeli/Palestinian negotiations. In short, it involves "beginning with the end in mind" - hashing out ideological differences on both sides and being really clear about the vision each side has for the future of Israel and Palestine. This will surely reveal gaping chasms of disagreement, but I think we may also find some interesting points of agreement (say, a mutual desire of long-term stability) that could serve as the foundation for negotiations on practical matters. A key part of this idea is that negotiations happen in total secret and regularly. The idea is to lower the stakes of the talks and reduce the need for political posturing. Repetition of dialogue produces the well-known effect of "extending the shadow of the future." An increased shadow of the future raises the costs of current defections, creates a regularity of stakes, makes information about the other side's actions more reliable, and generally builds trust.
These negotiations would need to take place in secret to insulate them from public pressure. But then I realized - would these diplomats - who are involved in open, honest discussions - report to their superiors on the discussions of that day? If they did, wouldn't superiors give their diplomats feedback and suggestions on how to proceed? If they did, wouldn't those impositions reflect the very thing secrecy is trying to insulate them from? They would bring to bear the expectations and biases of the societies and their governments, the politics, the history, and national identities of millions. It would defeat the purpose of the negotiations.
And so I ask myself now, isn't trying to insulate these negotiators very similar to trying to make them ignorant? And so I wonder whether the only people who can resolve disputes are those who know nothing. It's almost like putting them behind Rawls' veil of ignorance.
I have two misgivings about this thought: 1) If the negotiators were totally ignorant of what their governments and people want, any decision that was made would be rejected as a non-representative decision. Or the government would adopt it and the people would overthrow the government. 2) While writing my first misgiving, the second one seems to have slipped my mind.
Do you think this model makes sense - of insulating negotiators from political pressure to reach purer solutions? On the one hand it seems like it could remove all the white noise. On the other hand, it seems like it could remove all sound and leave the negotiations without reference points, making them useless for reaching a solution.
All the best,
Zvi
Hi everyone - so I had this random idea. What if world peace can only be achieved by the ignorant? Let me explain. There is a scene in the Hitch Hikers Guide to the Galaxy where the protagonists visit this planet inhabited by one man who lives in a cabin and who is, for all intents and purposes, crazy. One particularly knowledgeable character explains that it is this individual who runs the universe. Who else could?
I wonder if this is truer than Douglas Adams thought. I have been researching negotiation strategies and I have an idea about a new model for Israeli/Palestinian negotiations. In short, it involves "beginning with the end in mind" - hashing out ideological differences on both sides and being really clear about the vision each side has for the future of Israel and Palestine. This will surely reveal gaping chasms of disagreement, but I think we may also find some interesting points of agreement (say, a mutual desire of long-term stability) that could serve as the foundation for negotiations on practical matters. A key part of this idea is that negotiations happen in total secret and regularly. The idea is to lower the stakes of the talks and reduce the need for political posturing. Repetition of dialogue produces the well-known effect of "extending the shadow of the future." An increased shadow of the future raises the costs of current defections, creates a regularity of stakes, makes information about the other side's actions more reliable, and generally builds trust.
These negotiations would need to take place in secret to insulate them from public pressure. But then I realized - would these diplomats - who are involved in open, honest discussions - report to their superiors on the discussions of that day? If they did, wouldn't superiors give their diplomats feedback and suggestions on how to proceed? If they did, wouldn't those impositions reflect the very thing secrecy is trying to insulate them from? They would bring to bear the expectations and biases of the societies and their governments, the politics, the history, and national identities of millions. It would defeat the purpose of the negotiations.
And so I ask myself now, isn't trying to insulate these negotiators very similar to trying to make them ignorant? And so I wonder whether the only people who can resolve disputes are those who know nothing. It's almost like putting them behind Rawls' veil of ignorance.
I have two misgivings about this thought: 1) If the negotiators were totally ignorant of what their governments and people want, any decision that was made would be rejected as a non-representative decision. Or the government would adopt it and the people would overthrow the government. 2) While writing my first misgiving, the second one seems to have slipped my mind.
Do you think this model makes sense - of insulating negotiators from political pressure to reach purer solutions? On the one hand it seems like it could remove all the white noise. On the other hand, it seems like it could remove all sound and leave the negotiations without reference points, making them useless for reaching a solution.
All the best,
Zvi
Monday, November 12, 2007
The Language of Iran
After Ahmedinejad made those statements about Israel, the United States and Israel might conclude that it would be ridiculous to try to depose of Iran's current regime through the use of degrading language. As we are well aware, it is common policy for US and Israeli politicians to call the Islamic Republic a rogue state run by zealous fundamentalist mullahs bent on destroying the free world, if not something much worse. Such language, however, clearly a threat to the Islamic state, will need to be backed by real measures to overturn the system of governance in Iran if it is to be proved successful.
It is problematic to think that the Islamic state came into existence by fluke and that it will run itself into destruction in the near future without significant force. It should not be forgotten that the revolution in Iran was organized by the masses to overrun a cruel autocratic regime. Unlike the Bolshevik revolution, Iran's revolution was a mass popular uprising, and whether the majority of Iranians wished for this specific type of government to come to power or not, the Iranian state was established. A more valid historical example similar to the Iranian Revolution is that of the Romanian Revolution in 1989, which led to the overthrow of the autocratic regime of Nicolae Ceausescu.
Using language that threatens to overthrow a state is in many cases considered an act of war. Israel earnestly perceived it a significant threat when the newly elected president of Iran suggested that Israel should be obliterated off the map. It seems the hostile politician did not wish to maintain this threat and retracted his words with a subtle apology.
Both Israel and the United States have years of experience dealing with insubordinate nations and have been calculating in their use of language when trying to bring down these states. Yet today it seems that these two nations are speaking with increasingly excitable language against the Islamic State. Common sense might tell us that the use of threatening language, especially when not backed by real imminent credible force, increases resolve and dissuades negotiation. Even realists disgree with these tactics, and would much prefer a swift and decisive military strike over extensive articulation about the US and Israel's general dislike of the Iranian regime (Israel's strike against the Osirak reactor in Iraq is an excellent example of this.)
If either the US or Israel is interested in overturning the Republic, now is the time to do so, stalling until after they attain nuclear bomb technology is not wise. If this is not in their immediate plans, then these countries might find it preferable to engage Iran as a normal, self-interested UN member state, no matter how displeasing that might be.
It is problematic to think that the Islamic state came into existence by fluke and that it will run itself into destruction in the near future without significant force. It should not be forgotten that the revolution in Iran was organized by the masses to overrun a cruel autocratic regime. Unlike the Bolshevik revolution, Iran's revolution was a mass popular uprising, and whether the majority of Iranians wished for this specific type of government to come to power or not, the Iranian state was established. A more valid historical example similar to the Iranian Revolution is that of the Romanian Revolution in 1989, which led to the overthrow of the autocratic regime of Nicolae Ceausescu.
Using language that threatens to overthrow a state is in many cases considered an act of war. Israel earnestly perceived it a significant threat when the newly elected president of Iran suggested that Israel should be obliterated off the map. It seems the hostile politician did not wish to maintain this threat and retracted his words with a subtle apology.
Both Israel and the United States have years of experience dealing with insubordinate nations and have been calculating in their use of language when trying to bring down these states. Yet today it seems that these two nations are speaking with increasingly excitable language against the Islamic State. Common sense might tell us that the use of threatening language, especially when not backed by real imminent credible force, increases resolve and dissuades negotiation. Even realists disgree with these tactics, and would much prefer a swift and decisive military strike over extensive articulation about the US and Israel's general dislike of the Iranian regime (Israel's strike against the Osirak reactor in Iraq is an excellent example of this.)
If either the US or Israel is interested in overturning the Republic, now is the time to do so, stalling until after they attain nuclear bomb technology is not wise. If this is not in their immediate plans, then these countries might find it preferable to engage Iran as a normal, self-interested UN member state, no matter how displeasing that might be.
Monday, November 5, 2007
the economist Nov 3rd
I havent gotten a chance to read it yet, but theres an 18 page spread in this week's Economist on the new wars of religion. look forward to seeing everyone on Wed. --- Avi--
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